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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

No.

16342

v.
MILAN MACK BOYCE,
Defendant-Respondent.
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

COMES NOW Appellant in the above captioned case and
respectfully submits this reply to Respondent's Brief.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

On page 7 of his Brief, Respondent indicates that the
lower Court had opened the matter for additional discovery.
Both Appellant and Respondent have quoted from the transcript
of the hearing of September 8, 1978, both attempting to advance
a different position.

Both Appellant and Respondent have

attempted to cite this Court to those portions of the transcript
each considers relevant and informative.

Appellant will take

this opportunity to supply one final quotation.
At pages 13 and

1~

of his Brief, Respondent quotes

fromSponsored
pages
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following the final sentence quoted by Respondent, the
following paragraph is found:
(BY THE COURT): Now, if you want to do
it under any--if you want to clean up
the record and file a proper Rule 60(b)
motion, which is identified as such, now
that the Court has accepted your position
as far as the dismissal of the appeal. I
think you ought to do that, the next step,
just so in the event there's an appeal
from the order which is subsequently
entered that you have that order entered
pursuant to an opening under 60(b).
(R. 788) (Emphasis added.)
Appellant respectfully submits that when the
transcript of the Septanber 8th hearing is reviewed as a whole,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that the trial
court indicated that discovery could be commenced only after
the decision was
Rule 60(b),

~ade

to reopen the divorce case pursuant to

Pcoo, '~rcdent'

s counsel atgued vigorously that

discovery could not proceed until the case was so reopened,
and it appears from the transcript of the September 8 hearing
that the trial court agreed.
II.

Also, on page 7 of the Respondent's Brief is found
the statement:
The Court ruled that the Appellant failed
to prove the allegations of fraud (which
she admits on page 30 of her brief).
(R.527-530) ...
Respondent makes this statement based on the follow~
found in Appellant's Brief:
The October 17 hearing was not intended to,
and it did not, amount to formal proof of
common law fraud.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The point being made by Appellant in this statement is that it
was not necessary and Appellant did not attempt to put on
full-blown proof of all of the elements of common law fraud
to the lower court which was sitting not so much as a trial
court as a court of equity charged by law to see that substantial
justice was done.

The only issue before the lower court was

whether the matter should be reopened--not what damages
Appellant may have suffered.

The latter issue awaited a future

hearing after the judgment of divorce had been set aside and
Appellant afforded the opportunity for discovery.

Respondent

does not contend, nor could he contend, that it was necessary for
Appellant to prove every element of common law fraud by
preponderance of the evidence before the lower court would be
permitted to set aside the decree of divorce.

The analysis

presented by Appellant falls far short of an admission that
she failed to put on sufficient evidence to warrant a court of
equity setting aside the divorce.

This point is further

buttressed by the fact that Appellant could not have demanded
a jury in the Rule 60(b) motion, and it therefore borders on
ludicrous to assert that her burden was to prove common law
fraud by a preponderance of the evidence.

III.
On page 15 of his Brief, Respondent makes the statement:
In paragraph twelve (12) of her Affidavit
of January 22, 1979, entitled "Affidavit of
Nina Doreen Davis Boyce in Response to
Defendant's Answer and Counter Affidavit,"
Appellant states that she knew of t~e transfer
of the corporation prior to the Apr~l 7, 1978
hearing wherein the stipulation was entered.
(R.571-584) (Emphasis in original.)
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Indeed, this claimed transfer of assets impressed on Appellant
the futility of seeking an award of an interest in this
property.

It was not until after the financial statement of

May 1, 1978 came to light that Appellant knew that Respondent
still considered these same assets as his own.

A review of the affidavit referred to discloses the
following:
... Affiant was never informed until one or
two days prior to April 7, 1978, of the
claimed transfer of said corporation or its
stock to Insulation Corporation of America
or to Milan C. Boyce and/or Noriene Boyce.
(R.580)
Thus Appellant has admitted to learning of said transfer at
most two days before the April 7 divorce hearing whereas
according to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 herein, the transfer
supposedly

occuy~ej

on December 1, 1975.

IV.
At pages 14 through 20 of Respondent's Brief,
various of Appellant's allegations of fraud are paraphrased
and "responded to."

These responses contain numerous

misstatements which Appellant will not here attempt to point
out but which are obvious when reference is made to the
underlying pages of the record cited by Respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CASE OF HANER V. HANER CITED BY RESPONDENT
IS INAPPOSITE TO THE CASE AT BAR
Respondent cites the case of Haner v. Haner,
13 Utah 2nd 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962), for the proposition that
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a decree of divorce can be set aside only for that type of
fraud characterized as extrinsic fraud.

While it is true

that courts have generally made a distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud in determining whether final judgments
should be overturned, that distinction is not applicable to an
attempt under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
set aside a judgment.

Subsection (3) of that Rule provides

that a party may be relieved from a final judgment in cases of
"fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... "
(emphasis added).
Haner involved a "motion to set aside or modify a divorce
decree," and no mention is made anywhere in the opinion that the
motion was based on Rule 60(b).

(13 Utah 2d at 300.)

Even if the distinction between the two types of fraud
could be validly made, the Supreme Court in Haner listed as an
example of extrinsic fraud--and hence a proper ground for
granting relief from a judgment--"making false statements or
representations to the other party--to prevent [him] from
contesting the issues ... " (13 Utah 2d at 301).

Such false

statements and representations are precisely the issue in the
case at bar, and Appellant's evidence showed that such statements
and misrepresentations effectively prevented her from contesting
the issue of a fair and equitable property settlement.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Haner is
inapposite to the case at bar.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT RULED BASED ON THE AFFIDAVIT
OF RESPONDENT IN THE FACE OF DIRECT TESTIMONY
ADDUCED IN OPEN COURT, AND TO DO SO WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR
Respondent maintains that the lower court based its
decision only on the testimony adduced at the October 17
hearing and not on the voluminous affidavit styled "Answer
and Counter-Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of
Motion for Relief from Final Decree" or any of the other
affidavits submitted by Respondent.

A review of the

Memorandum Decision of the lower court found at pages 527
through 530 of the record herein reveals the following
statement which is the only place in the record approaching
a finding of fact:
The Court is of the op~n~on that all the
i~~ormation contained in the subsequent affidavit
2nc a~~ of the allegations pro and con contained
-~ ~ffidavits filed b~ defendant countering
affidavits by plainti f were well-known to
plaintiff and her competent counsel prior to
the original Decree having been entered into
on the 19th of May, 1978, and also prior to
the entering into the Stipulation of the 7th day
of April, 1978. (R.529) (Emphasis added)
Respondent's 'Answer and Counter-Affidavits" is a
rambling document some 180 pages in length, and contains, for
example, the following information which the trial court
apparently charged the Appellant with "knowing."
(R.373)

"Further, while the Defendant loved his wife
and would have shared anv and all things
with her had she been genuinely interested
and wanted to know, the Defendant felt that
he had at the same time, been cheated and
swindled so much, so man~ times and in so
many ways by the Plaintiff's father, the
monitary
total
running
tensof Museum
of and
thousands
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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of dollars, and because there had developed
a competition and bitter jealousy and even
a hatred between them, it is true that in
the last year or so of marriage the Defendant
was somewhat guarded as to what he shared
with the Plaintiff about his business affairs.
This was because of her lack of genuine
interest and in lieu thereof of the second-hand
interest of her skeeming [sic] father (whom
the Defendant over the years grew to despise
because of his lyings and cheatings and
psudo-religious unfairness to the Defendant)."

(R.386)

(R.392)

Further, after a considerable amount of therapy,
both from the marriage counselor and the
psychiatrist, the Defendant realized that to
continue in this so-called marriage would be
foolish and impossible, and that divorce would
be better than to continue in the mental torment
created by the Plaintiff's "sick family system."

(R.-+08409)

So, since the Plaintiff and her parents say (even
over the objection of the Bishop and Stake
President) that this divorce is inspired, Churchauthorized, and Priesthood approved, the Defendant
is now after considerable marriage counseling
and th~rapy, willing to let them (that is, the
Plaintiff and/or her father) or even God (at some
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future time) be the judge of that.
The Plaintiff's father took her (the Plaintiff)
to the law firm of Backman, Clark & Marsh, her
initial lawyers, because he didn't like the
attorney she had picked--if the Defendant's
memory serves him correctly, the Plaintiff's
father said (in the same conversation at the
kitchen table) that it was because the attorney
she had picked was suing him or handling some
action against him (the Plaintiff's father,
Wendel A. Davis) or one of the businesses he
is affiliated with. The defendant had a note
in which he had written the details of this
conversation; but, (at the time of the
preparation of this affidavit) he can not
locate the note. But, in any event, the Defendant
has always felt that Backman, Clark & Marsh
was used as an unholy and improper way of
going around the Stake President to Brother
Backman, the Regional Representative of the
Tweleve, who would be the next higher man in
the Priesthood line of authority. (Prima
facie evidence of this is the fact that after
Brother Backman's Church assignment was changed,
the Plaintiff changed law firms to Mr. David A.
Goodwill, who's office is located in the same
building with attorneys who are the general
counsel ~o~ the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-~a~ Saints, indicating even further
Church climbing.) Further, the Defendant also
thought the unholy and improper Church climbing
might even go as high as Brother Delbert L. Stapley,
a relative of the Plaintiff's father, and the
man who married the parties hereto; or maybe
even as high as Brother N. Eldon Tanner, a
personal acquaintance of the Plaintiff's family.
While this Church climbing is wrong and not the
order of the Church and would not knowingly be
condoned by any of these three good brethren,
(two of whom are General Authorities of the
Church), it was apparently engaged in by the
Plaintiff and/or her parents, because the Stake
President told the Defendant he had received
a telephone call asking him, the Stake President,
if he knew what was going on in his Stake. The
Stake President added that the call was not from
Brother Stapley, but he did not say whom the
call was from. So the Defendant knows that,
contrary to the order of the Church, some
improper Church climbing had to be going on for
anyone higher than the Stake President to have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
digitization
provided President;
by the Institute of Museum
and Library
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deduction can be made from what the Stake
President said about it not being from
Brother Stapley, then the unholy and
improper Church climbing went quite high
up in the Church.
THE DEFENDANT HAS STATED AND SET FORTH THE
FOREGOING TO SHOW THE COURT THE KIND OF
"ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING" THE PLAINTIFF AND
HER FAMILY HAS PARTICIPATED IN TO CREATE AND
INFLICT MENTAL DISTRESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL
CRUELTY, AND EVEN PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE UPON
THE DEFENDANT. THE FOREGOING IS ALSO
RELEVANT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT BELIEVES THAT
THIS "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE FINAL DECREE
OF DIVORCE" IS A FORM OF LEGAL HARASSMENT
SIMILAR TO THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES OF RELIGIOUS
HARASSMENT, ALREADY CARRIED OUT BY THE
PLAINTIFF AND HER FAMILY. Further, they have
always tried to inflict this type of thing
upon the Defendant (and others as well) by
their pseudo-religious, self-righteous, and
very "sick family system", as the therapists
put it. (Emphasis in the original.)
By its quasi-finding, the trial court would
also apparently charge Appellant with "well knowing" the statements
in an affidavit elicited by Respondent from the teenage son of
the parties to the effect that mother (Appellant) "lies," and
"Grandpa Davis" (Appellant's father) was a thief.

(R.428-4-34.)

These are but a few examples illustrative of all of
the affidavits submitted by Respondent in this case.

Appellant

points out in passing that there are several extremely grave
defects in Respondent's "Answer and Counter-Affidavits."

For

example, all of the sub-affidavits attached thereto and found in
the court file are copies; not one is an original.

Furthermore,

several of the copies show no sign of originally bearing a notary
seal.

The main affidavit itself was executed October 16, 1978

while a further affidavit of Milan Mack Boyce attached thereto
as Exhibit "E" (R.446-460) was executed on November 30, 1978.
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The Affidavit of Craig M. Strom attached as Exhibit "K"
(R.481-483) and the Second Affidavit of Craig Marvin Strom
attached as Exhibit "N" (R. 490-492), bear two different
signatures.
A further example is found in Respondent's
Petition to Set Aside the Temporary Order of the Court and
to restore the Decree of Divorce Herein (R. 307-335).

In said

Petition Respondent represents that in order to borrow money
it was necessary for him to enter into an "Agreement" with
Zions First National Bank.

Respondent attached Exhibit "E"

(R. 322-324) as evidence of said "Agreement."

That document

was never signed by Noall J. Bennett on behalf of Zions and
a representative of Zions was prepared to so testify on
October 17, 1978, but was not permitted to do so because the
hearing was terminated.
E,·~c:

c

2cusory examination of these "documents"

reveal a presentation to the lower court almost beyond
belief, and yet all of this was not only considered by the
lower court but, according to its Memorandum Decision, formed
the basis of its ruling.

Not one shred of Respondent's

"evidence" was subject to cross-examination by Appellant.

The

lower court basing its decision on said "documents" in the faci
of direct evidence adduced in open court by Appellant
constitutes reversible error.
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It is respectfully submitted that the lower
court's Memorandum Decision makes it clear that the lower
court relied solely on the affidavits of Respondent in
coming

to its decision even though Appellant had presented

evidence both oral and documentary in open court.

For the lower

court to have done so was prejudicial to Appellant and
constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis along with Appellant's Brief
to this Honorable Court show that the lower court erred in
refusing to grant Appellant's Motion for relief from the
Decree of Divorce.

It is respectfully submitted that this

court should therefore reverse the lower court and order the
lower court to set aside the Decree of Divorce and permit full
discovery so that the full extent of the fraud perpetrated by
Respondent can be presented, or in the alternative to require
the trial court to permit full discovery preparatory to a
hearing on a motion to modify the decree as it pertains to
property distribution, child support and alimony.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE, CHILD

& RITCHIE

R. M. Child
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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